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There is much talk about environmental policies being faulty. Past policies are being criticised
for failing to achieve environmental goals (the environmentalist complaint), for being overly
expensive (the industrialist complaint) and for failing to encourage innovation and dynamic
efficiency (the complaint of economists dealing with innovation). This paper looks at the
innovation and technology adoption effects of past environmental policies. It finds indeed few
examples of environmental policies that stimulated innovation. The common technology
response is the use of expensive end-of-pipe solutions and incremental process changes
offering limited environmental gains. This begs the question: why did the policies fail to
promote more radical innovation and dynamic efficiency? One explanation—well-recognised
in the economic literature—is the capture of government policies by special interests. This
paper offers a second explanation—based on innovation and technology adoption studies—
which says that in order to have a decisive and socially beneficial influence policy instruments
must be fine-tuned to the circumstances in which sociotechnical change processes occur and tip
the balance. Within this alternative view, the starting point of government interventions is the
capabilities, interests, interdependencies and games of social actors around an environmental
problem instead of the set of environmental policy instruments for achieving an environmental
goal. The paper sees a need for government authorities to be explicitly concerned with technical
change (rather than implicitly through a change in the economic frame conditions) and to be
concerned with institutional arrangements beyond the choice of policy instruments, and act as a
change agent. This requires different roles for policy makers: that of a sponsor, planner,
regulator, matchmaker, alignment actor and ‘creative game regulator’. The paper offers two
perspectives on environmental policy: an instrument one and a modulation one. The latter is
especially important for promoting innovation and bringing about radical change, something
which is very difficult with traditional regulatory instruments. Instruments for promoting
environment-enhancing technical change are  appraised and suggestions are offered for the
purposes for which different policy instruments may be used in differing economic contexts.
                                                          
1 This research memorandum is written in the context of the PRET project supported by the Netherlands
Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). It draws on earlier work done by the author on
environmental policy instruments and environmental innovation, described in his book Environmental
Policy and Technical Change. The author wants to thank Aart de Zeeuw, Frank den Butter, Peter Mulder
and other participants of a PRET workshop for comments on an earlier version of the paper.governance of environment-enhancing technical change 2
1. Technology impacts of environmental policies
There exists a small literature on the impact of actual environmental regulations on
compliance innovation and clean technology. This literature consists of the work of
Ashford and Heaton in the 1980s in the US, Kemp (1997) and a number of German
studies (Hartje (1985); Hemmelskamp, 1998; Elder (1999)). The focus of these studies
is on technical innovation. What these studies show is that the technology responses
range from the diffusion of existing technology, incremental changes in processes,
product reformulation to product substitution and the development of new processes.
The most common responses to regulation are incremental innovation in processes and
products and diffusion of existing technology (in the form of end-of-pipe solutions and
non-innovative substitutions of existing substances). Often the new technologies are
developed by firms outside the regulated industry, which means that in the past industry
was reliant upon suppliers, capital good suppliers and environmental technology
suppliers. (This is changing with the growing attention in environmental policy and
industry to prevention and product change). The studies also show, unsurprisingly, that
the stringency of the regulation is an important determinant of the degree of innovation
with stringent regulations such as product bans being necessary for radical technology
responses. Technology-forcing standards appear to be a necessary condition for bringing
about innovative compliance responses. The studies further show that long before the
regulations are promulgated there is a search process for solutions to the problem, both
by the regulated industry (mostly for defensive reasons),  their suppliers and outsiders.
This happened in the case of PCBs and CFCs where firms both in and outside the
chemical industry were looking for substitutes 10 year before the use of PCBs and CFCs
was banned (Ashford, et al., 1985). Of course, the certainty that their product or activity
would be subject to regulations was an important factor.
As to the nature (incremental or radical, product or process related) and the source of
technological solutions an internal OECD report established that:
· High volume, mature sectors were resistant to change, although very amenable to
environmental monitoring and process controls that improved efficiency. This fits
with the Abernathy-Utterback product life cycle model that during the life time of a
product a sector becomes rigid, especially those sectors that are capital intensive.
An alternative explanation is that such sectors are powerful and able to fight off
regulations that require a major change in their process technologies.
· Significant process innovations occurred in response to stringent regulations that
gave firms in the regulated industry enough time to develop comprehensive
strategies. There is a tradeoff between achieving quick results and radical change.
· Smaller firms and potential new entrants tended to develop more innovative
responses. A possible explanation for this is that incumbent firms, especially the big
ones, are vested in old technologies both economically and mentally.
· The environmental goods and services industry provided compliance strategies that
were at best incrementally innovative, but which diffused fast, due to their lack of
disruption and acceptability to regulators.
· Regulatory flexibility toward the means of compliance, variation in the
requirements imposed on different sectors, and compliance time periods weregovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 3
aspects of performance standards that contributed to the development of superior
technological responses.
What the studies show is that technology responses are not a simple response to a
regulatory pressure. Apart from the regulatory stimulus, there were many other factors
that exercised influence. This suggests that the stimulus-response model is too simple.
For one thing it assumes that social innovation starts with regulation which is most
often not the case. Regulation is not the be-all and end-all of social innovation. The
knowledge for such innovations is usually available, regulations may provide the
leverage or some extra stimulus for the exploitation. Regulation is but one of many
stimuli. It may in fact not be needed for environmental innovation. Many technologies
producing environmental benefits are adopted for normal business reasons of reducing
costs and enhancing product quality. These options are referred to as eco-efficiency
options.
2 But even for environmentally beneficial technologies that do not combine
environmental gains with economic gains regulation may not be needed. In the case of
an environmentally harmful product there will always will be pressures to reduce the
harm. These pressures come from a range of actors: insurance companies, banks,
customers, employees, environmentalist groups, and consumer organisations through
product tests which include environmental aspects.
3
These pressures act as stimuli for technology development and can be seen as diffuse
technology forcing. People want firms not only to deliver goods and services but also to
behave in a socially responsible way. The public/political climate generates a credibility
pressure on firms: they lose goodwill if they neglect environmental issues too openly.
When the early synthetic detergents of the 1960s created very visible environmental
problems (foam in surface water), the detergent companies and especially their suppliers
developed new processes leading to biodegradable synthetic detergents, without
government regulation (although with the expectation that there might be regulation in
the future). The voicing of concern and the threat of regulation may be enough to induce
industry to look for alternative. Given the information problem of the government, the
threat of regulation may be a better means to stimulate technological innovation than
actual regulations (Rip and Kemp, 1998).
A real problem for regulators is that environmental innovations and technologies not
only must be environmentally beneficial but also must meet a range of other demands:
they should be expendable, it should be possible to fit them into existing processes, and
in the case of products, they should meet user requirements in terms of performance
characteristics. Water saving shower heads should be comfortable (have sufficient
stream power) and environmentally improved detergents should have good washing
performance. User benefits and social performance benefits must be balanced and co-
optimised. It is this co-optimisation that creates a problem for innovators and for
environmental regulators. For example, it proved to be very difficult to develop
phosphate free detergents with equal washing power as the phosphate-based. It took
                                                          
2 The term eco-efficiency is coined by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. See
Schmidtheiny (1996).
3 According to Baynes an environmental progamme manager of Sony the score of consumer products in
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German companies many years and more than 500 mln DM to develop alternatives
with satisfactory washing performance. The actual regulations on phosphate content co-
evolved with the results from product tests (both toxicological tests and tests about
washing performance) (Hartje, 1985).
What this example shows is that innovations can not simply be ‘elicited by legal fiat’
(Heaton, 1990), moulded in a pre-defined, socially desirable shape. This is why
emission limits are based on assessments what is technologically possible and
economically affordable, and why environmental permits are often based on the
concept of Best Available Technology or Best Practicable Means that are specified in
BAT lists or guidance notes for permitting agents. There is a dynamic interplay
between innovation and regulation; the stimulus response model fails to appreciate this.
(In fact, innovation, in the sense of a available technological solution to problem, may
pave the way and thus be the stimulus for regulation, which suggests that the causality
goes either way).
The obvious implication of all this is that the governance of technical change is not a
simple matter. It is difficult to design instruments that ‘do the job’, and do it well: that
lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes in the sense that society as a whole is better off.
Evaluation studies of environmental policy instruments show that the instruments in
themselves are either ineffective in achieving a set goal or outcome, or inefficient in
terms of costs or technology choice. An example is the ONO technology used in the
Dutch metal plating industry to control the release of metals into receiving waters which
led to production of toxic sludge containing heavy metals which had to be treated.
4
Below we will provide a discussion of experiences with various environmental policies,
especially subsidies and covenants. Starting with subsidies. Subsidies are an important
element of government policy towards technology. They are a key instrument of
innovation policy. As a politically attractive instrument, they have been an important part
of environmental policies. In the Netherlands, several studies have been undertaken into
the effectiveness of investment subsidies for environmental technologies. A common
outcomes of such studies is that subsidies had a limited impact on decisions. This was
true for investment subsidies under the “Wet Investeringsregeling” (WIR) which found
that investment subsidies for environmental technologies (being 15 per cent of total
investment costs) induced only 8 per cent of the firms to undertake investments they
would not have done otherwise (Tweede Kamer, 1987, p.39). Curiously, this led the
Dutch government to conclude that the subsidy scheme was ‘reasonably effective’. The
same result is found a study of Vermeulen (1992 which analysed the effectiveness of
three types of investment subsidies. The results of this study, based on a questionnaire
(just like the study of the WIR), are given in Table 1.
                                                          
4 A discussion of the factors that led to the use of ONO installations for the control of metal discharges is
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very effective    0%  2%  1%
reasonably effective 37% 22% 20%
hardly effective 13% 23%  3%




Source:  Vermeulen (1992, p.210)
According to the study by Vermeulen, the investment subsidies for the replacement of
PCB equipment, quieter new trucks, and the storage of manure were effective in only a
small number of cases. The subsidies were the primary reason for investing in the
environmentally beneficial technologies in 2 per cent of the cases for silent trucks and 1
per cent for manure storage. For PCB replacement equipment the figure was even zero.
The investment subsidies were reasonably effective for 37 per cent of the firms that used
PCBs (and only in 22 and 20 per cent of the cases in the other two sectors). In all three
cases, other factors were more important than the subsidies, such as fuel economy, road
performance and comfort in the case of silent trucks, health and safety considerations in
the case of PCB replacement, and environmental regulations in the case of the manure
storage.
5 According to Vermeulen, under the three programmes, 200 million guilders
(about 125 million US dollars) were spent without having any effect on polluter's
purchasing decisions.
I myself studied the effectiveness of investment subsidies for thermal insulation under the
National Insulation Programme (NIP) in the Netherlands. I used econometric analysis for
this in the form of diffusion models that were fitted to the data. The statistical analysis
established that there was only a weak positive relationship between the subsidies for
thermal home improvements which totalled 2 billion Dutch guilders (0.9 billion dollar at
the current exchange rate) and the diffusion of thermal insulation technologies: the
coefficients of the dummy variables for investment subsidies were positive but not
significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent significance level. This result is
confirmed by another study which asked applicants for the subsidy about their motivation
for investing in thermal home insulation. Only 11 per cent of the respondents said that the
subsidy was the primary motivation for investing in thermal insulation (Beumer et al.,
1993, p.42). Cost savings and improved comfort were the main reasons for investing in
thermal home insulation.
                                                          
5 Vermeulen also analysed whether the information provided by government authorities about the
availability of subsidies and about the adverse environmental effects of existing technologies and practices
influenced the decisions of firms to invest in environmentally preferable technologies. This was only so for
PCBs, which not only had adverse health and detrimental environmental effects but also posed a fire and
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Other evaluation studies of investment subsidies for environmentally beneficial tech-
nologies (including energy conservation, solar boilers and co-generation of heat and
power) arrive at similar conclusions. With the exception of the investment subsidy for
CHP, and, possibly, the subsidy for wind turbines, the effectiveness of the investment
subsidies in the Netherlands was small (Evaluatiecommissie WABM, 1992).
In all the examples above, the subsidies provided applicants with a windfall gain. It is
unclear to what extent they encouraged technological innovation, but given that the
subsidies hardly influenced adopter decisions, the innovation effects are likely to be
small. This does not disqualify investment subsidies as such. There are also examples of
subsidy schemes that were effective. An example is the subsidy for clean automobiles
combined with a tax for cars with high emission levels introduced in the Netherlands in
1986 to stimulate clean vehicles. The way in which the system worked was that the
subsidies for clean cars (equipped with a catalytic converter) were paid out of the extra
tax revenues from the sales of highly polluting cars. This policy proved to be very
effective: the share of clean cars in new car sales increased from 15 per cent in 1986 to 90
per cent in 1990.
6 The same kind of policy was used to encourage the supply and
distribution of unleaded gasoline to protect catalytic converter emission control systems
used in cars. Due to a differentiation in excise taxes, unleaded gasoline (first only regular
but later also super gasoline) became cheaper than leaded gasoline. Oil companies
quickly responded to these changes in the tax regime by offering unleaded gasoline for
sale.
7
What about the effectiveness of subsidies for the development of environmentally
preferable technologies? Did R&D subsidies stimulate firms to undertake research in
environmental technology, that is, research they would not have done otherwise? This is
a question which has not been studied in a systematic way, at least not in the Netherlands.
However, the evidence that is available suggests that R&D subsidies in the Netherlands
for environmental technology have been of limited effectiveness. According to the study
by Olsthoorn, Oosterhuis and Verbruggen (1992, p.18), the “Stimuleringsregeling
Milieutechnologie” (STIR-MT) for the development of environmental technology did not
elicit new research projects. This conclusion corresponds with the observation by de Jong
and van der Ven (1985, pp.78-79) that innovator firms develop environmentally
beneficial technologies not because a subsidy is available but because they believe a
market exists for the new technology. The conclusion is at odds with two other
evaluation studies, quoted in Cramer et al. (1990), that find that of the 10 projects that
received financial support under the Clean Technology programme in the Netherlands,
five would never have been initiated. However, it turned out that many of the projects
funded under the programme were second-rate projects: of the ten projects only seven
were technically successful and only four of them were applied in practice. On the whole
the results are not encouraging: it may be that the R&D subsidies accelerated the
                                                          
     6 Evaluatiecommissie WABM (1992, p.39) based on Klok (1989b).
     7 The quick response of oil companies was due in part to the fact that the manufacture of unleaded
gasoline did not require any technological innovation. The manufacture of (high-performance) unleaded
gasoline was something oil companies in the US had already mastered in the 1970s, to comply with US
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development of environmental technologies, but this is unclear. There are few examples
of successful clean technologies requiring a technology development programme.
The experience with the Danish Clean Technology Development Programme, described
in Georg et al. (1992) is more positive. Under the programme, industries, private and
semi-governmental research institutions could apply for financial aid for developing and
implementing clean technology. The programme was oriented at stimulating preventive
process solutions and cooperation among technology suppliers, research institutes,
consultancy firms, and users. The Danish Environmental Protection Agency played an
active role in selecting environmentally beneficial projects and in finding the right partner
with whom to co-operate. That is, the agency acted as a match maker to elicit
environmentally innovative solutions, something that previous subsidy programmes had
failed to do.
8 According to the authors, the Danish programme was a success. In almost
all cases, appropriate technical solutions were found for the environment problems at
hand. In more than half of the projects, substantial environmental improvements were
achieved at low costs. Some projects led to net economic gains for the polluting firms.
Taxes and tradeable permits
What about the experiences with taxes and tradeable permits? Did they promote
innovation? The answer is that we do not know. The experiences with the tradeable
permits for SO2 are very positive as far as efficiency is concerned. In a first estimation,
cost gains of 50% have been reported (Palmer et al., 1995) But there is little evidence that
they promoted innovation. The innovation effects of environmental taxes is a topic which
has been barely analysed. But as the taxes are usually set at a low level, I expect the
innovation effects to be very low.
Covenants
What are the experiences with covenants (environmental agreements between industry
and government) in promoting innovation and environmental technology diffusion?
Covenants are negotiated agreements between industry and the government in which the
industry promises to reduce the environmental burden of their products and activities.
They are a relatively new instrument of environmental policy. The effectiveness of eight
product-related covenants in the Netherlands is analysed in Klok (1989a). The covenants
covered products such as mercury-oxide batteries, alkaline batteries, beverage packages,
heavy trucks, and PET bottles and the use of cadmium in beer cases, CFCs in aerosols,
and phosphates in detergents. Most covenants were about the substitution of an
environmentally hazardous substance. According to Klok, the effectiveness of covenants
was typically small: when environmental improvements were achieved, this was more
due to autonomous technological change, external regulations (such as EC guidelines),
and the evolution of market demand than to covenants. Furthermore, there is little
evidence that the covenants fostered technological innovation. An exception is the KWS-
2000 programme in the Netherlands to reduce VOC emissions which stimulated research
into low-solvent paints, especially for the housing market. Covenants are used now for
                                                          
     8 The project was more than a subsidy programme. The programme brought together firms with an
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achieving reductions in energy use in the Netherlands (but also Germany), where sectors
promised to reduce their energy use by 20 per cent in 2000 compared to 1989 levels.
Again, the impact on innovation is likely to be limited as such reductions can be met with
existing technology. In our view, this demonstrates a disadvantage of covenants, and,
more general, of public-private partnerships. If policy makers want to make further use of
covenants, these should be more oriented towards innovation.
Innovation waivers
One way to promote environmental innovation is through the use of innovation wavers.
Innovation waivers are incentive devices built into environmental regulation. Generally,
they extend the deadline by which industry must install pollution control equipment to
meet emission limitation requirements. They exempt industry from penalties during trial
periods and offer the prospect of cost savings derived from superior technology (Ashford
et al., 1985, p.444). In theory, innovation waivers seem very attractive for both potential
innovators and the regulating agency. They have been used in the US with little success.
The reasons for this had to do with the short and inflexible deadlines which acted as a
disincentive for innovation, especially for radical innovation, and shortfalls in the way in
which the programme was administered. Under the Clean Air Act, the responsibility of
issuing innovation waivers was given to the Stationary Source Compliance Division
(SSCD) of the Environmental Protection Agency, a division with limited technical exper-
tise, whose primary task was enforcement. As it turned out, the SSCD narrowly inter-
preted the waiver provisions, provided little guidance and the agency took a long time
before it arrived at a decision.
In retrospect, it is easy to comprehend why innovation waivers were unsuccessful in the
above case. This does not disqualify innovation waivers per se. There are several remedies
to the problems encountered, many of which are given by the authors - such as
administration of the programme by people trained to interact with industry, the establish-
ment of a technology review panel, delineation of eligibility criteria, and longer time
allowances. It does illustrate, however, the difficulties in designing regulations that
encourage technological change towards efficient conservation of environmental qualities.
After describing the experience with government policies to stimulate environmental
benign technologies, I now turn to the topic of best policies to promote the development
of environmental innovation and diffusion. There are 2 ways to approach this issue. One
way is to focus on policy instruments, and examine for what purposes (stimulation of
innovation or diffusion or both) in what technological and economic context they might
be usefully applied. This is what I have done in my book Environmental Policy and
Technical Change. Another way to tackle the issue, is to take the dynamics of
sociotechnical change (including processes of assessment and anticipation) as the starting
point for a discussion of governance: how these may be modulated into more
environmentally benign directions. The second approach is something that I have
explored with Arie Rip in the book chapter Technological Change of Human Choice and
Climate Change and two Dutch projects I am presently involved in: the MATRIC and
PRET project. It uses a evolutionary view described in Dosi et al (1988), Nelson (1994)
Freeman (1992), Edquist (1997),  Lipsey (1998), Metcalfe and Georghiou (1998) and
Kemp et al. (1998 and 1999) and Faucheux (2000).governance of environment-enhancing technical change 9
2. The pros and cons of environmental policy instruments
This section takes an instrument-based view towards environmental policy. It addresses
the question: what is the best environmental policy instrument to encourage technological
innovation and diffusion? As I will argue below, there is no single best policy instrument
to stimulate clean technology, all instruments have a role to play, depending on the
context in which they are to be used. Suggestions are offered as to the purposes for which
and context in which particular instruments may be used to obtain environmental
protection benefits through the use of technology.
Environmental standards
As explained in the previous section, the experiences with environmental policies are
mixed, and often negative. Emission standards that were often based on available end-of-
pipe technologies (which was often the case) provided little incentive for the
development of new, more effective technologies; they merely stimulated the diffusion of
existing technologies. This demonstrates the danger of using technology-based standards
and the importance of taking a long-term view towards environmental protection.
Technology-forcing standards that require the development of new technologies are a
better way of encouraging technological innovation, as the regulatory experiences in the
United States demonstrate. However, they may impose high costs on industry—unless
the regulator is willing to soften and delay standards, but this would have a negative
effect on the willingness of suppliers to develop innovations. In our view, technology-
forcing standards should only be used when technological opportunities are available that
can be developed at low enough costs. The chance that these opportunities will be
developed is greater when potential suppliers are located outside the regulated industry.
Outsiders are also more likely to develop radical solutions to environmental problems
(Heaton, 1990). The reason why innovative solutions are often developed by outsiders is
that they have technological capabilities for dealing with environmental problems that the
regulated industry lacks, they also have a stronger interest in developing compliance
technology.
When using standards it is important that the regulator gives industry enough time to
develop solutions that are environmentally benign and meet important user requirements.
Time may also be needed for finding out whether a solution is environmentally benign
and does not pose other hazards. One way of dealing with the problem of compliance
time is by giving firms innovation waivers that exempt them from regulations during a
certain period. If innovation waivers are used, it is important that firms are given
sufficiently long time allowances and that the eligibility criteria are clear. Another
strategy is the setting of long-term standards that require the development of new
technology. To deal with the problem of strategic behaviour of industry, such standards
are best supplemented by a system of fines. Fines also make the system more flexible and
offer a way out of the economic problem of compliance for firms with relatively high
compliance costs.governance of environment-enhancing technical change 10
Economic incentives
Decentralized incentive systems (such as taxes and tradeable pollution rights) are an
alternative to command-and-control policies. They are favoured by economists and
international organizations such as the OECD. The theoretical benefits of incentive-based
approaches to reducing pollutant emissions are many. First, effluent fees (or charges and
taxes) and tradeable quotas are more efficient because every polluter is given the choice
between compliance and paying the polluter's bill. The polluting firm cannot be forced to
undertake emissions control of which the marginal costs are higher than the effluent fee.
This means that environmental benefits are achieved at the lowest abatement costs.
9
Second, there is a financial incentive to diminish all pollution—not merely up to the level
of emissions standards. They create a constant demand for innovation (Stewart, 1981,
p.1373). (The economic belief that incentive-based approaches provide a greater
inducement to innovate is based on this argument.) Third, such a system depends less
than standards-based policies on the availability of pollution control technology and can
therefore be introduced more quickly at lower decisional costs by reducing demands on
regulatory process to decide complex, detailed engineering and economic questions
(Stewart, 1981, p.1374). Fourth, the danger that polluting industries fail to develop new
technologies for strategic reasons is less under an incentive-based regime. And fifth,
economic instruments tend to stimulate process-integrated solutions (including recycling
technology) rather than end-of-pipe technologies that have been overwhelmingly applied
in the past.
A disadvantage of effluent charges is the uncertainty about the polluters' responses.
Another disadvantage is that the total environmental costs (abatement costs plus tax
payments) are likely to be high, which lowers their political attractiveness, and may
induce the regulator to set a low tax (as happened in countries in which they are used).
Since freely distributed tradeable pollution quotas do not suffer from this they may be
better instruments to stimulate environmental innovation than taxes or charges.
There are other disadvantages of economic instruments. First, in order to be effective,
polluters must be responsive to price signals, which is not always the case. For instance,
two evaluation studies in the Netherlands revealed that price considerations played a
limited role in the timing of investments in thermal home improvements. This suggests
that price incentives are probably better suited to change the behaviour of firms than the
purchasing decisions of consumers. Second, the price incentive must be sufficiently high
to induce firms to develop and implement environmentally beneficial technologies. This
was not the case in most environmental policies in which economic instruments were
used (an exception is the effluent charge in the Netherlands discussed later on). And
third, in dealing with transnational environmental problems such as greenhouse warming,
taxes should be used unilaterally only if their introduction does not put national industries
at a serious competitive disadvantage—that is, they should be introduced in those sectors
where the environmental costs are a small part of total costs or in sectors sheltered from
international competition.
                                                          
     9 According to Hahn and Hester (1989, pp.100-101), the US emission trading programme introduced in
1974 resulted in cost savings in emission control between 1 and 13 billion dollars. Almost all of these
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Subsidies
Uncertainty about the demand for cleaner technologies, partly related to unpredictable
government policy, may call for the use of R&D subsidies or loans. The agency
responsible for the subsidy programme should be careful however not to stimulate
second-rate technologies. The use of subsidies should be restricted to environmentally
beneficial technologies for which a market does not yet exist, for example, technologies
with long development times (as in the case of energy technologies) or technologies for
which there are problems of appropriating the benefits of innovation by the innovator (for
example, when imitation is easy). R&D programmes may also be used to increase the
number of technological solutions when there is uncertainty about environmental
solutions. Subsidies for investments in pollution control technology are less useful in our
view. They clash with the polluter-pays-principle and are expensive; in addition,
evaluation research in the Netherlands has proved them to be only minimally effective.
There is a great risk that such subsidies provide windfall gains for the firms and
consumers receiving them. They should be used only when a switch to cleaner tech-
nology entails high costs and produces competitive disadvantages due to less strict
regulation in other countries.
Communication
Communication instruments can be useful policy tools for addressing information
problems related to products and processes. Environmental management and auditing
systems in business (required in the Netherlands for large firms), demonstration projects
and information campaigns can be useful to ensure that firms make better use of the
possibilities available for emission reduction, especially cost-reducing environmental
measures. Information disclosure requirements, such as those in the US, that force firms
to communicate environment-related information, product information and ‘green’ labels
are also believed to be useful. They increase pressures on firms to improve their
environmental record, enhance the environmental awareness of firms, and make the
market for green products more transparent. They are useful as additional instruments,
not as substitutes for environmental regulations or taxes.
Covenants
Covenants are a new policy instrument within environmental policy, in Europe and the
US. Covenants are contracts between industry or an industrial sector and government in
which industry promises to progressively reduce the environmental burden of its
activities within a certain period (often five to ten years) according to certain targets.
They are also referred to as `voluntary agreements' as firms that belong to a sector are
free to enter the sectoral agreement. (If they don't they will be subject to regular licensing
procedures.) Covenants are attractive to industry as they leave industry more freedom
with regard to the method and moment of compliance, thus lowering the so-called
regulatory burden. By handing over responsibility for achieving environmental
improvements to industry, covenants may stimulate environmental responsibility of firms
which is important for the wider integration of environmental concerns in companies'
decisions. From the viewpoint of the environmental control agency, covenants aregovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 12
attractive by lowering the administrative burden and for establishing a better, more
cooperative relationship with business.
A clear disadvantage of the use of covenants is the danger of strategic exploitation of the
agreements by industrial firms who may engage in free-rider behaviour, or, more likely,
underexploit the opportunities for innovation by claiming that it is impossible to meet the
targets through compliance technology that meets important user requirements. Such
behaviour may jeopardize the fulfillment of environmental agreements. The softness of
covenants, or voluntary agreements in general, means that there is little incentive for
third-party suppliers to develop compliance technologies as the market for the new
technologies is insufficiently secured. If covenants remain to be used in the future, as
they probably will be, they should be more oriented towards innovation. One way of
doing this is through technology compacts between public authorities and private firms to
implement long-term technological change (Banks and Heaton, 1995, p.49). In the
compact, industry commits itself to performance goals that require new and advanced
technology in exchange for enforcement flexibility and guaranteed acceptance of a new
technology. The system looks attractive but, just as covenants, could be exploited by
industry who has superior knowledge of what is technologically possible.
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This brings us to a more fundamental issue: the ability of the industry to influence and
capture the details of environmental policies. Industry is known to have a great influence
over the details of environmental policies, especially standards. Thus, an additional
criterion on which to judge environmental policy instruments is the chance of
institutional capture of policies by special interests.
What role for what instruments?
A summary of my views on the use of environmental policy instruments is given in Table
2 in the Appendix. The table describes the effectiveness and efficiency characteristics of
different policy instruments, the purpose for which they may be used (to stimulate
technological innovation or diffusion), and the context in which they may be applied,
based on the experiences with environmental policies and studies of environmentally
benign technical change. It should be noted that they reflect the views of the author, they
are not the outcome of a rigorous model.
Economic incentives
Economic incentives have an important role to play in environmental policy. They leave
freedom as to the choice and moment of compliance, and provide an incentive to go
beyond environmental standards. Especially in the case of heterogeneous firms with
different production technologies, economic instruments are attractive. They are more
economically efficient than standards, giving equivalent environmental improvements at
lower costs, which, in principle, allows policy makers to achieve greater emissions
reductions. But there are certain limitations to their effective use, which are often not
recognised in the discussion on the design of environmental policy. For example, there is
                                                          
10 Aggeri (1999) offers a discussion of the usefulness of cooperative approaches to promote innovation.
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a danger that economic incentives such as taxes and subsidies provide a too weak and
indirect stimulus. Many people who studied the technology responses to environmental
pressures take this view. In their study of clean technology in the UK, Irwin and Hooper
(1992) found that state incentives had only a marginal impact on innovation. This and
other considerations led them to the view that “a sensitive but firm policy of putting
regulatory pressure on waste and pollution output will be more effective in focusing
industrial minds”. Hartje (1984) in studying the innovation decisions of detergent
manufacturers doubted that a tax policy would have achieved a switch away from phos-
phate-based detergents. The 50 per cent reduction requirement for phosphates created a
certain market of significant size for phosphate substitutes.
The idea that regulations are more effective and better suited for making firms invest in
environmental measures is also widely shared by environmental authorities. For example,
in the US, environmental authorities responsible for pollution prevention programmes
stated almost without exception that stringent and certain regulatory demands (such as
emission, effluent, or exposure standards, or product bans and phase-outs) are necessary
to effectuate pollution prevention. Economic instruments are seen as complements to, not
substitutes for, regulatory requirements (Ashford, 1993, p.296).
In general, economic incentives may be more suited to stimulate technological diffusion
than innovation. A clear example of the effectiveness of economic instruments is
provided by the diffusion of biological waste-water treatment plants in the Netherlands.
The increase in the effluent charge from Dfl 5.42 in 1973 to Dfl 74.26 in 1991 per unit of
`population equivalent' (the typical measuring rod) induced many firms to invest to invest
in biological effluent treatment systems. The diffusion speed was considerably higher for
indirect dischargers who discharged their effluent into a collective effluent treatment
plant than for direct dischargers. A counter example also from the Netherlands is the
diffusion of thermal home improvement technologies where subsidies and energy prices
played a limited role in the timing of thermal home improvements.
R&D progammes
In order to stimulate technological innovation, a more focused approach may be needed.
One way of doing this is through R&D programmes for environmental technologies or
more environmentally benign energy technologies. But as noted with R&D support there
is always the danger that the programmes promote second-rate technologies and provide
windfall gains to the recipients.
Technology-forcing standards
Another strategy to promote environmental innovation is by specifying strict
environmental standards that require the development of new technologies. However, this
should be done only in situations where the environmental risks are large and acute and
when there is consensus about the most viable technological solution or trajectory. If
there is no such consensus there is a danger that technology-forcing standards lock
industry into overly expensive and suboptimal technical solutions. In such circumstances
there is a need for further research and experiments to learn more about the technological
possibilities, about the disadvantages of particular solutions (and how they may begovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 14
overcome), the economic costs and environmental gains of the technologies, and their
acceptability to society. When using direct regulation, policy makers should give careful
attention to the actual design of standards: their strictness, differentiation, timing, ad-
ministration, flexibility and enforcement. The experiences in the US with innovation
waivers and tradeable permits (described in Hahn, 1989) illustrate that the ways in which
the instruments are designed and implemented are important determinants of the
technological responses of industry. This is also the conclusion of Blazejczak, Edler,
Hemmelskamp and Jänicke (1999) on the basis of German Studies. The authors developed
a set of hypotheses about innovation-friendly environmental policy, having to do with




Another way of encouraging technological innovation is to build a network of technology
suppliers, users, and research institutes, as in the Danish Clean Technology Development
Programme. This programme not only provided firms with economic incentives for
developing and implementing clean technologies, but, more importantly, provided them
with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding efficient technological
solutions to specific environmental problems (Georg et al., 1992, pp.545-546). Of course,
such a policy is not easy; it requires special competence on the part of policy makers.
They must have a technological understanding of the production processes, the associated
environmental problems and possible solutions if they are to act as a ‘matchmaker’ and
identify the relevant participants for the development projects. They must also be careful
to make sure that more radical solutions with potentially larger environmental benefits
are developed and used.
Technology compacts
Technology compacts, described in Banks and Heaton (1995), are another way to
promote technological innovation by setting an agenda of phased increments of
technological change. As with covenants and negotiated rule making, there is the danger
of strategic behaviour on the part of industry who may claim that it is impossible to
develop technology that is both environmentally superior and economically feasible.
Exploiting synergies between instruments
From the discussion it should be clear that there is no single best instrument. Generally,
policy instruments should be combined with one another to benefit from synergistic
effects. A combination of standards with economic instruments is particularly useful by
combining effectiveness with efficiency. A good example of an effective and
economically efficient environmental policy are the US corporate automobile fuel
economy  (CAFE) standards which set progressive fuel economy targets for automobile
                                                          
11 According to them innovation-friendly policy instruments should rely on the use of economic
incentives, act in combination, be based on strategic planning and formulation of goals and support
innovation as a process and take account of the different phases of innovation. Innovation-friendly policy
styles are based on dialogue and consensus, are decisive, proactive and ambitious, open, flexible and
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manufacturers in the 1979-85 period under penalty of a fine of $50 per car sold for each
mile per gallon of shortfall. Tradeable pollution permits also deserve to be used more as
they too combine effectiveness with efficiency. At this moment a nation-wide market
exists for SO2 in the US where utilities can trade SO2 rights at the Chicago Board of
Trade. Early results suggest that the tradeable permits for sulphur dioxide emissions will
reduce the costs of the 1990 acid rain programme by 50 percent or more (Palmer et al.,
1995).
3. Modulating dynamics of sociotechnical change through public policy
This section offers an alternative, non-instrument-based view on government policy for
achieving environmental protection benefits, based on insights from technology
dynamics studies, which sees technical change as a multi-actor and multi-level process.
Within the alternative view, the starting point for policy and entrance point of
government interventions is the capabilities, interests, interdependencies and interactions
(games) of social actors around an environmental problem instead of the environmental
problem itself and how this problem may be solved through the use of environmental
policy instruments. In section 1 we saw that environmental policies being applied were
not effective in securing goals (when goals were obtained it was usually through other
developments). The policies were also found not to be efficient: the same results could
have been achieved at lower costs, sometimes the costs exceeded the benefits from
environmental protection, sometimes it was the other way—rarely do costs and benefits
of government intervention equate at the margin. An explanation for this is that the
instruments did not fit the economic-institutional context in which they were applied.
This context consists of the problem holders (private and public companies engaged in
environmentally disruptive activities, households), the actors who could supply a
technical solution to the problem (capital good suppliers, government labs, consulting
companies and other knowledge institutes, and the problem industry) and a range of other
actors: environmental pressure groups, banks, insurance companies, users, scientist
groups, and of course the government and politicians, each with their own interests,
resources, views, assumptions and values. In this context the environmental problem is
not given, but discussed and negotiated. Same with the solutions. Different actors favour
different solutions. There is a continuing battle both over problem definitions and
solutions, in an evolving sociotechnical landscape.
These battles are not a peripheral thing: they have an important influence on the choice
and practical design of instruments (Hahn, 1989; Majone, 1976; Bressers and Huitema,
1996). According to Majone, the performance of policy instruments depends even more
on the institutional framework in which they are used than on their technical
characteristics. As he writes:
“The actual outcomes of environmental policies are affected more by the
institutional arrangements emerging from the political process than by the technical
characteristics of the instruments employed; to use a statistical image, the ‘within
group’ effects (the differential results obtained when the same tool operates under
different institutional circumstances) dominate the ‘between groups’ effects (the
results of different tools used under approximately equal conditions)”, which leads
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policy instruments but among institutionally determined ways of operating them”
(Majone, 1976, p.593).
Economists—more than any other profession—tend to find the influence of societal
actors through politics on the choice and design of policy instruments a nuisance, as
something which gets into the way of obtaining environmental benefits in an efficient
way and elevating society to a higher level of wellbeing. But instead of deploring such
societal interactions, such aspects should be taken into account. Policy should not be
viewed as something which can occur outside society, especially not a democratic one.
The government itself not only accommodates different interests but also houses them.
This should not be assumed away. The modulation view first sketched in Rip and Kemp
(1998) and further developed in Rip and Schot (1998) tries to offer a way out of this
problem through its focus on societal interactions, and seeks to exploit interests in a way
which benefits society at large.  It says that government policy should be aimed not so
much at achieving particular outcomes through the use of policy instruments but at
modulating the dynamics of sociotechnical change, at making sure that the outcome of
interactions—between firms and other actors in markets and policy arenas—lead to
desirable outcomes. Within a modulation view, the different interests and problem-
solving capabilities of actors, their agendas, expectations, ties and dependencies and the
rules of the game (for example the way in which the policy making process is structured)
are the entrance point of interventions.
The modulation views also says that the focus of environmental technology policy should
be on all technologies. Any technology which uses less materials and energy is de facto
an ‘environmental technology’, although some people may object to the use of this word.
Such technologies should be an important target point of policy that tries to reconcile
economic goals with environmental protection. It says that apart from changing frame
conditions for technical change in an environment-friendly way there is a need for
environmental policy to be explicitly—rather than implicitly—concerned with technical
change. Here the main difference lies with economic views on environmental policy.
Key terms are alignment, network management, game management and process
management; the overall concept is that of modulating technical change into
environmentally beneficial directions. It says that government interventions should go
beyond changing the cost and demand structure in which technical change occurs.
Policies should be concerned with fostering linkages and establish a guide for
environmental investment though for example the establishment of goals. This should be
done in consultation with industry. Policies should take into account technical
developments and utilise these for achieving environmental improvements. Sometimes
this requires game management when industry is resistant to exploit certain possibilities
because they have an interest in incumbent technologies.
The aim of game management is to create a situation in which there is a search for
environment-friendly solutions and to select the best one. Here governments intervene in
the competitive games between private companies and interactions between companies
and social groups over problem definitions and appropriate solutions. This can be done in
various ways: by changing the "rules of the games" or by changing the way in which the
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(bringing in outsider firms with different interests and capabilities), prolong the game
when no satisfactory results are likely to emerge, empower certain voices, and
manipulate technological and economic expectations—for example, by securing a
(future) market for a new product or by announcing that there will be a ban on a
substances if scientific evidence tells that is dangerous. Game management seeks to
exploit differences in economic interests by changing the stakes. It helps to go beyond
win-win solutions within the existing economic framework. The power of markets is
utilised by incorporating ecological concerns in the competitive process, for example by
allowing only those products that are best from an ecological perspective. This helps to
promote a search process for solutions, both by companies who are supplying an
environmentally disruptive product and outsider firms operating in a different market.
Game management creates winners and losers. In less conflict-ridden situations,
government agencies could act not as a game manager but as a match maker by bringing
together technology suppliers to work on a problem, promote learning and providing
financial assistance. In the case of technological controversies, they could organise
discussions between proponents and opponents, to generate better understanding of the
issues at stake and guide technology developers in their decisions. Here they act as a
mediator or moderator.
Apart from game management, network management and changing the economic frame
conditions (through the use of taxes, covenants, standards, subsidies, etc.) there is also a
need for policy to be oriented towards capacity building: to enhance the ability of
companies to design environmentally improved products and their ability to adopt clean
technologies. Lenox and Ehrenfeld (1997) speak about a company’s ‘environmental
design capability’: the ability to incorporate environmental concerns into product
development. This capability depends on the integration of diverse knowledge
resources through communicative linkages and on practical tools (such as design for the
environment and green accounting) but also on the thought worlds or ‘interpretive
structures’ of the actors. In their study on green product development they found that
resources are insufficient if they are not linked with design teams and embedded in
interpretive structures which value and understand the environmental information
received (Lenox and Ehrenfeld, 1997, p.195). Environmental management systems—
which are compulsory for big environmentally intensive companies in the
Netherlands—are a tool to achieve this, and were introduced precisely for this reason
by Dutch authorities. Here we see that governments are already engaged in alignment
policies, assuming a role as capacity builder and alignment agent.
The policies of alignment, capacity building and exploiting differences in economic
interest through game management are not a substitute for the traditional policies. Within
a modulation view, there is a need for corrective policies, either in the form of taxes,
tradeable permits, environmental standards, fines and so on—policies hat change the
frame conditions for economic behaviour and technical change. Such policies may be
used to achieve set policy goals and limits and as part of a modulation approach in which
the goals are not predetermined in a very specific way.  The modulation approach thus
does not preclude the use of traditional policies, it shows how policies may be used in a
different way. It helps to identify useful points for intervention and exercise some
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This is important because in order for the policy interventions to have a decisive
influence they must  tip the balance of economic decision-making.
A modulation approach thus helps to see new entrance points for intervention for
governments but also other actors (like NGOs) who want to further environmental goals.
Changing the frame conditions through a pollution tax or regulation may not be sufficient
for bringing about innovative responses. As expounded in structuralist-evolutionary
approaches of technical change (Freeman, 1992; Nelson 1994; and Dosi, 1988) and as
shown by virtually every management study, economic actors are not automata
responding mechanically to changes in the cost and demand conditions. What an
organisation and the people in it can do technologically is determined by what they have
been doing in the past. Organisations have developed strategies and the people in them
are equipped with an outlook on problems, certain capabilities and ways of doing which
also acts as a shaping factor. At the same time, organisations are not altogether victims of
the past. They have developed systems of intelligence for pursuing change and
transformation. Companies, especially the multi billion ones with large capital assets in
dynamic markets are forward-looking, they scan new technological developments and
engage in the surveillance of market developments—the outcomes of which inform their
research agenda and strategies. It is these things (the expectations, processes of
anticipation, but also the capabilities and outlooks) that could be made an entrance point
for government intervention, or at least an important consideration in the choice and
design of government policy.
Examples of such entrance points for modulation policies are described in Schot and Rip
(1998), Geels (1999) and Kemp et al. (2000). Important entrance points for interventions
for governments (but also other actors) to further environmental goals through innovation
are:
·  Processes of anticipation and assessment (orientation towards the future) which might
be improved. Actors do assessment all the time. They make assumptions about where
their market is going. They scan possible technological futures and makes guesses
about the impacts of changes in the sociotechnical landscape (such as the emergence
of internet and public call for corporate responsibility) for their sector and company.
Existing attempts of assessment might be broadened so as to include also
environmental considerations. Discussions of sustainable futures and the
development of sustainability images (“toekomstbeelden van duurzaamheid”) are a
way to bring in environmental concerns in processes of anticipation.
·  Networks for learning and interaction which might be created with the help of
government direct or indirectly through the funding of collaborative research.
·  Promises-requirements cycles: to assist in the articulation of new technological
possibilities, in the articulation of problems connected with their use and articulation
of needs and wants; ways to do this is through technology experimentation and
agenda building.
·  Niches: spaces in which technologies are protected against selection pressures, acting
as a learning environment and possible stepping stone for overall system change.
One tool to improve processes of anticipation and assessment and shape research agendas
is the use of scenarios. Geels (1999) has described how the development of
sociotechnical scenarios may contribute to processes of anticipation and alignment, andgovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 19
thus serve as vehicle for change. He identifies 3 purposes for which STSc may be used. A
first purpose is that of promoting strategic thinking. STSc may help actors think more
systematically about possible impacts of technologies and their role in the co-evolution of
technology and society. Decisions and social interaction are informed by ‘diffuse
scenarios’ (Rip and Schot, 1999). Actors are guided by assumptions about the role of
humans, artefacts, organisations in future worlds. STS can be used to make the diffuse
scenarios explicit and increase their quality.
A second purpose for which STSc could be used is to make ‘road maps’ and explore
technological paths and technological ‘forks’, which then serve to inform public and
private policy. STSc may be used to identify pathway technologies: technologies that
allow you to move away from an existing technology regime to a new one. On the basis
of their socio-technical scenarios about future transport systems, Elzen et al. (1998)
identified light-weight electric vehicles as possible important stepping stones towards a
more environmentally benign transport systems. These vehicles have a high innovation-
cascade potential, and allow for co-evolutionary learning, in which people’s ideas of
what a car should do may change.
The third purpose for which STSc may be used is to facilitate processes of mutual
understanding between antagonistic actors. The framework on which STSc are built
requires the participants to make their assumptions explicit, which is a precondition for
mutual understanding. Differences in assumption and values may be unraveled through
‘argumentive scenarios’. This has been done by Rip, Smit and van der Meulen (1994) on
the issue of long-lived radioactive waste disposal. This also seems useful to do for
biotechnology, a technology which is acclaimed to possess a significant potential for
achieving environmental benefits.
The first two purposes have to do with orienting actors to the future and stimulating
strategic thinking and thought experiments. The third with mediating conflicting views
and interests.
Sociotechnical scenarios are referred by Geels to as “a tool for reflexive technology
policy”. They do not deliver ‘silver bullet’ solutions or offer ready-made advice in terms
of what to do. The same is true for modulation policies. They offer a somewhat different
perspective on governance which may be applied in an instrumental way, to achieve
desirable outcomes.
An example of a modulation policy is strategic niche management. Strategic niche
management (SNM) is a new approach, first suggested by Rip and further developed by
Schot et al. (1994), Kemp et al. (1998) and Weber et al. (1999). SNM is aimed at
modulating the dynamics of socio-technical change through the creation and
management of spaces (niches) for the use of a new technology. In the spaces the
technology is partly and temporarily protected from the normal selection pressures of
business.
12 The creation and management of niches is a way to work towards regime
change.
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SNM involves the real use of technologies, in selected (protected) settings. The actual
use of a new technology is important for articulation processes to take place, to learn
about the viability of the new technology and build a network around the product
whose semi-coordinated actions are necessary to bring about a substantial shift in
interconnected technologies and practices. As we have argued, this is important in
fostering regime shifts.
SNM is especially appropriate for so-called pathway technologies. Pathway
technologies are technologies that (may) pave the way for new developments. They
may also be called bridging technologies. They help to bridge the gap between the
current regime (in which they may be used for certain purposes) and a new and more
sustainable one. Pathway technologies are compatible with both the old and new
regime and allow for a cascade of innovations. Energy storage is an example of a
pathway technology: the storage of energy is important for the use of renewables but
also useful within the centralised energy system as it may be used to deal with peak
demand, helping to reduce peak loads. Electric propulsion and transport telematics
(electronic information and reservation systems about transit) are examples of pathway
technologies for public and intermodal transport. Both have been supported by public
policies through special research programmes and there has been investment from
industry in these technologies but there still is a gap between research and diffusion. A
special type of support action is needed to bridge this gap. The Zero Emission Mandate
of California which required that a certain percentage of new vehicles sold (2 per cent
in 1998 and 10 per cent in 2003) are zero emission vehicles (at the point of use) is an
attempt to cross this gap. It consisted of a forced introduction of zero emission vehicles
in the market. It gave a big boost to the development of batteries, electric propulsion
systems, quick recharging systems. It did not result in the wide use of BEVs but it
forced automobile manufacturers to work on electric propulsion systems and to rethink
car design. The attention to alternative fuel vehicles has resulted in the development of
hybrid electric vehicles (in which batteries are combined with an internal combustion
engine) and fuel cell vehicles. The latter will be introduced in the market in 2003,
hybrid electric vehicles are already for sale.
The advantage of SNM is that is targeted to specific problems and needs connected
with the use of new technologies and practices. User experiences are used to inform
private investment and government support policies. By carefully choosing an
appropriate domain of application the costs (of discomfort) may be kept low. Windows
of opportunity are exploited at the local level while at the same time a transition path is
created to a new and more sustainable system in a non-disruptive way. It helps actors to
negotiate and explore various interpretations of the usefulness of specific technological
options and the conditions of their application. Thus, SNM highlights choices and
                                                                                                                                                                        
research, to use office time, space and equipment. Sometimes an entirely new company unit is created in
which a new product is developed free from the usual decision calculus. An example is the Smart car for
which a technological niche is created through company subsidies, but with the hope that the car will
become remunerative or that the knowledge obtained will pay off in some manner. Sometimes research
in companies is kept secretly to the rest of the company because it may threaten positions within a
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options and makes the introduction process more transparent and do-able for all parties
involved including producers, users and policy-makers (Weber et al., 1998).
SNM has been attempted by companies for radical innovations such as optical fibres,
cellular telephones, aspartame, and computer axial tomography (CT) scanners (Lynn et
al., 1996), who used early markets as a stepping stone for penetrating mass markets. It
is a new approach for policy makers although some government policies such as the
ZEM in California and the Danish policy towards wind power could be labeled as de
facto SNM policies.
Finally, it is to be noted that SNM is not a substitute for existing policies, but a useful
addition, which is appropriate for working towards more sustainable technology
systems. In doing so, SNM contributes to the goal of ecological restructuring. It is an
example of an ‘evolutionary’ policy, aimed at deliberately creating path dependencies,
and thus paths through circles of virtuous feedback through carefully targeted policy
interventions, rather than at correcting perceived market failures. It helps to work
towards system renewal instead of optimisation.
Final remarks
In this section I have put forward a strong argument for a modulation approach which
attempts to steer processes of interaction rather than achieve particular outcomes, for
example a particular reduction of pollutants. Examples of modulation policies are game
management or the use of taxes. These policies fall into two categories: those that are
explicitly concerned with processes of learning and innovation and those that are not.
Taxes, subsidies, standards, covenants fall into the latter category.  They have an
important role to play in environmental policy. But there are limits to what can be
achieved with such policies. In my opinion however they are unlikely to bring about an
eco-restructuring. They may be used for achieving an ‘environmental upgrading’ of a
sector or chain, what Elzen et al, (1996) call ‘system optimisation’. They are less suited
for achieving ‘system renewal’ or ‘eco-transformation’ which involves a replacement of
existing trajectories by ones that are more environmental friendly. To achieve system
renewal generic macropolicies are likely to be insufficient given the dominance of
existing trajectories that have benefited from dynamic scale and learning economies and
adaptation of the demand side and uncertainty about the alternatives. One has to appraise
new trajectories and work towards them. This can be done through technology foresights
and societal discussions and through experimentation at the local level with new
technologies. Possible government policies to work towards system renewal are: the
creation of spaces for learning about new technologies, the establishment of long term
goals, and indicative, adaptive planning to guide private and public investment into new
directions.
This requires a different type of approach for policy making, more participatory and more
oriented towards experimentation, and the use of policies that are forward-looking,
adaptive and reflexive. Suggestions as to actual policy interventions for promoting
innovation, diffusion and system change into environment-enhancing directions can be
found in Table 2 in the appendix. This table shows that there is no single policy that  can
do the job. All policies have a role to play, depending on the context in which andgovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 22
purpose for which they are applied. Designing environmental policies that promote
innovation and dynamic efficiency (as opposed to the achievement of short term goals) is
not an easy task. But this paper has suggested many practical policies how this may be
done, using old and new entrance points for intervention.
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Table 2 Suggestions about the use of policy instruments to promote the development and use of environmentally beneficial technologies in differing contexts
Policy instrument General inherent characteristics Purpose for which they
may be used




·  effective in most cases (is when they are
adequately enforced)
·  uniform standards give rise to inefficien-




·  when differences in the marginal costs
of pollution abatement are small and
economically feasible solutions to en-
vironmental problems are available
Technology-forcing stan-
dards
·  effective (in focussing industry's minds on
environmental problem)
·  danger of forcing industry to invest in
overly expensive and suboptimal tech-
nologies
·  problem of credibility
technological innovation ·  when technological opportunities are
available that can be developed at low
enough costs
·  when there is a consensus about the
appropriate compliance technology
Innovation waivers ·  same as technology-forcing standards technological
innovation
·  when technological opportunities are
available and when there is uncertain-
ty about best solution
Eco-taxes ·  efficient
·  uncertainty about industry response
·  danger that they provide a too weak and
indirect stimulus
·  total environmental costs for industry are
likely to be high







·  in case of heterogeneous polluters that
respond to price signals
·  when there are many different technol-
ogies for achieving environmental
benefitsgovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 27 27
Tradeable permits ·  effective
·  cost effective (which means that environ-




·  same as taxes
·  costs of monitoring and transaction
should not be prohibitively high
Covenants and technology
compacts
·  uncertainty about whether industry will
meet agreements; should be sup-
plemented with penalty for non-compl-
iance
·  low administrative costs
technological diffusion ·  in case of many polluters and many
technological solutions
·  when monitoring environmental per-
formance is expensive
R&D subsidies ·  danger of funding second-rate projects
·  danger of providing windfall gains to
recipients
technological innovation ·  when markets for environmental tech-
nology do not yet exist and when there
is uncertainty about future policies
·  when there are problems of appropria-
ting the benefits from innovation
·  when there are important knowledge
spillovers
·  in case of large social benefits and
insufficient private benefits
Investment subsidies ·  in conflict with polluter-pays principle
·  danger of windfall gains politically
expedient
technological diffusion ·  when industry suffers a competitive
disadvantage due to less strict regulat-
ions in other countries
Communication (e.g. eco-
labels)
·  helps to focus the attention of firms and
consumers on environmental problems
and available solutions to these problems
·  little coercive power
technological diffusion ·  when there is a lack of environmental
consciousness
·  when there are information failures
Network management ·  creates a platform for learning and
interaction, to stimulate alignment
technological diffusion
and innovation
·  when there are information failuresgovernance of environment-enhancing technical change 28 28
coordinate interdependent activities
solutions may be tailored to specific
needs














·  Broadens processes of assessment




For altering fixed ideas
and mind sets
Setting of goals and use of
indicative planning
·  Provides clarity and (strategic) orientation For shaping business
expectations and guiding
strategic decisions
Game management Radical innovations with
significant sustainability
benefits that do not offer
a win-win solution







to stimulate processes of
co-evolution
·  For pathway technologies to a more
sustainable system
·  In case of attractive domains of
application